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Note
Does the Bible Preempt Contract Law?: A Critical
Examination of Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a
Cleric's Breach of Employment Contract Claim
Against a Religious Organization
David J. Overstreet*
For more than a decade, the Synod of Lakes and Prairies
of the Presbyterian Church employed Reverend Robert Jeam-
bey in the non-ministerial position of Executive Director for
Communications and Stewardship.' The long-term employ-
ment relationship abruptly ended, however, when the Synod
forced Jeambey to resign amid allegations of sexual miscon-
duct.2 When Jeambey attempted to bring a breach of employ-
ment contract claim against the Synod, the court ruled that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment barred secular
adjudication of the employment contract claim.3
Employment-based lawsuits against religious organiza-
tions4 have become more common over the last three decades.5
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1993
University of Minnesota. The author would like to thank Casey Streich, Esq.
for his valuable assistance and insight with this Note.
1. Jeambey v. Synod of Lakes & Prairies, No. CX-95-902, 1995 WL
619814, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1995).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *2. Rejecting Jeambey's claim that the court could secularly
analyze the procedures outlined in the employee handbook, the court believed
that any such inquiry would excessively entangle the state in religious doc-
trine. Id.
4. The term "religious organization" as used in this Note refers to both a
place of worship, such as a church, synagogue, or mosque, and an institution
that is owned and operated by a religious collective, such as a parochial
school, seminary, religiously affiliated university, nonprofit or profit corpora-
tion, shelter, agency, or mission society. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of
the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or
Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 585 (1995) (providing the definition of
"religious organization" used in this Note).
5. Most published opinions involving employment claims against relig-
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To shield themselves from the potential liability these lawsuits
pose, religious organizations have sought protection in the
First Amendment.6 Courts have largely embraced the view
that the First Amendment prohibits judicial intrusion into the
employment matters of a religious organization, especially
when the employee is a member of the clergy. Consequently,
courts have routinely dismissed employment actions filed by
clergy members, leaving them with severely limited employ-
ment rights.
7
Traditionally wary of resolving disputes arising within re-
ligious organizations,8 courts became even more reluctant to
entertain cleric employment lawsuits after the federal courts
ious organizations have arisen since the 1970s. This relatively recent phe-
nomenon corresponds with the beginning of the erosion of the at-will employ-
ment doctrine. See J. Michael Fitzgerald & Lynne M. L. Fitzgerald, Media-
tion: A Systemic Alternative to Litigation for Resolution of Church
Employment Disputes, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 507, 510-11 (1993) (discussing
the creation of exceptions to the at-will doctrine and the rise of employment
litigation to argue for the use of mediation in church employment disputes).
Moreover, the increase in employment litigation involving religious or-
ganizations also should be attributed to the increased presence of such or-
ganizations in the national economy. In 1992, religious organizations em-
ployed over 1.15 million individuals. JAMES C. FRANKLIN, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE AMERICAN WORK FORcE: 1992-2005, at 54 (1994). For a relative
perspective, the U.S. Postal Service employed about .66 million individuals in
1992. Id.
As religious organizations continue to expand into commercial and non-
profit businesses, the number of individuals affected by religious employment
and personnel policies increase. Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the
Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 277 (1994). At the same time, so does an organi-
zation's "risk of entanglement in civil litigation" over employment disputes.
Patrick Garry, Churches and the Courts: The First Amendment Protection
from Clergy Lawsuits, 9 J. L. & RELIGION 179, 179 (1991).
6. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. From this language springs the Constitution's
two safeguards for religious liberty: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
7. See Garry, supra note 5, at 187 (observing that courts have continu-
ally refused to adjudicate employment-related lawsuits between religious or-
ganizations and clergy); see also infra Part I.C (describing how the majority of
courts have dismissed both discrimination and contract claims brought by
clergy). One court described the lack of clergy employment rights in noting:
[S]ecular courts will not attempt to right wrongs related to the hir-
ing, firing, discipline or administration of clergy. Implicit in this
statement of the rule is the acknowledgment that such wrongs may
exist, that they may be severe, and that the administration of the
church itself may be inadequate to provide a remedy.
Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
8. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court's deferential stance toward intrachurch disputes).
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exempted clergy from the protections of federal anti-discrimi-
nation laws on the ground that the First Amendment accords
religious organizations autonomy in core ecclesiastical mat-
ters.9 Over the last few decades, courts have extended this
autonomy rationale to non-clergy employees whom the courts
consider central to the spiritual mission of religious organiza-
tions.10 These employees include a parochial school teacher, 11 a
seminary professor,12 and even a church organist. 3  More re-
cently, courts have relied on the autonomy rationale to justify
nonadjudication of another type of employment-based claim,
breach of employment contract. 4 Yet such reliance is highly
questionable given that contract formation is purely voluntary,
undermining the assertion by religious organizations that they
are constitutionally privileged to be free from coercive govern-
mental regulation. 5
This Note explores the constitutional limitations on secu-
9. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (detailing the influential
federal circuit discrimination cases).
10. A significant, doctrinal by-product of the discrimination cases is the
ministerial/nonministerial test devised by the federal courts. The test is used
to determine whether a non-clergy employee should nonetheless be considered
clergy and whether the autonomy rationale should extend to that employee.
"As a general rule, if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she should
be considered 'clergy.'" Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Ad-
ventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Dis-
crimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination
by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)); cf. David
L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion Through Labor and Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REv. 27, 30 (1992) ("Only those
employees of religious institutional employers who perform wholly secular
functions and become irrevocably and systematically marginalized at the very
bottom of workplace hierarchies have any realistic hope of receiving some
passing judicial interest.").
11. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640
N.E.2d 681, 683 (IlM. App. Ct. 1994) (concluding that a parochial school teacher
should be considered clergy).
12. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651
F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that members of a seminary faculty
should be considered clergy).
13. See, e.g., Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233, 238
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that a church organist should be considered
clergy).
14. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (listing cases that have dis-
missed a cleric's breach of employment contract claim against a religious or-
ganization).
15. See infra Part I.B (arguing the voluntary nature of contract under-
cuts a religious organization's claim to institutional autonomy).
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lar adjudication of breach of employment contract claims that
clergy bring against their religious employers. Part I surveys
applicable constitutional jurisprudence and reviews both em-
ployment discrimination and contract principles. Part I also
describes current judicial approaches to employment cases in-
volving religious employers. Part II questions the doctrinal
support for the proposition that a clergy member's employment
contract claim, like a discrimination action, must be dismissed
under the First Amendment solely because the plaintiff is a
cleric. Part III advocates that courts in breach of contract
cases should focus less on the work the plaintiff performs for
the religious organization and more on the gravamen of the
contract claim. Specifically, Part III analyzes within a consti-
tutional framework the two most common circumstances that
arise in the adjudication of an employment contract claim
against a religious organization: when the employee attempts
to imply a contract from promises contained in a religious
document and when the employer proffers a religious-based
just cause reason for the dismissal. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that while many contract claims are nonjudicable under
the First Amendment, courts that summarily dismiss all con-
tract claims solely because of a plaintiff's job status place un-
just limitations on the disposition of contract disputes.
I. THE LEGAL PARAMETERS OF CIVIL ADJUDICATION
OF RELIGIOUS EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS
A. EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
The Supreme Court has declared that the First Amend-
ment accords religious organizations the right to regulate in-
ternal matters of ecclesiastical significance free from outside
governmental interference. 6 The Court, however, has been
vague about which religion clause, the Free Exercise Clause or
the Establishment Clause, serves as the source of this religious
freedom. 7 Without clear precedent, 8 lower courts have em-
16. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)
(recognizing "a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence
from secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for them-
selves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine"); see also Garry, supra note 5, at 180 ("The great
weight of judicial authority, dating back more than one hundred years, has
maintained the freedom of religious organizations to govern themselves and
to resolve church disputes according to their own church laws and rules.").
17. See Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution
[Vol. 81:263266
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ployed various combinations of the Free Exercise Clause's
compelling interest test, the Establishment Clause's Lemon
test, and a body of Supreme Court precedent concerning intra-
church disputes.' 9 Each constitutional doctrine has its own
analytical framework, and all three are currently in a state of
flux.
2o
1. The Free Exercise Clause and the Compelling State
Interest Test
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause to guarantee individuals the unequivocal right to hold
religious beliefs of whatever nature they choose.21 At the same
time, however, the Court has declared that the right to act in
accordance with those beliefs is less than absolute.2 Since
1963, the Court has employed a balancing test to decide the
constitutionality of any state action that burdens an individ-
ual's religious practice.2 Under this balancing test, the Court
of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1380, 1381 (1981) (observing
that the Supreme Court has been obscure about which religion clause governs
the constitutionality of secular adjudication of intrachurch disputes).
18. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Auton-
omy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1981) (arguing that most of the judicial
uncertainty surrounding employment and labor litigation involving churches
derives from the Supreme Court's failure to develop a "coherent general the-
ory of the religion clauses").
19. See Part I.C (discussing the various doctrinal approaches courts have
employed to analyze the constitutionality of secular adjudication of employ-
ment disputes involving religious organizations).
20. See Laycock, supra note 18, at 1395 ("The doctrinal details of [a relig-
ious organization's] right to autonomy are in flux and not entirely clear.").
2L See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 877 (1990) ("The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the
right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires."); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("The door of the Free Exercise
Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious
beliefs as such.").
22. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) ("Our cases have long rec-
ognized a distinction between the freedom of individual belief, which is abso-
lute, and the freedom of individual conduct, which is not absolute."); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[T]he [First] Amendment em-
braces two concepts, -freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is ab-
solute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.").
23. The Court first articulated the test in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-07.
The Court applies the test when a governmental regulation is specifically tar-
geted to prohibit a religious practice. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993) (applying the compel-
ling interest test to a state statute passed to suppress a religion's ritual sacri-
fice of animals). Additionally, the Court applies the test when an individual
seeks an exemption from a facially neutral law because of the burden on the
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first examines whether the individual's conduct is motivated
by a sincerely held religious belief.24 Once that threshold in-
quiry is met, the Court weighs the magnitude of the burden on
the religious-based conduct25 against the government's interest
in imposing the burden.26
Notwithstanding the Court's occasional use of language
implying that only a compelling governmental interest will
override an individual's religious liberty,27 the majority of the
Court's decisions have denied an individual's religious-based
exemption from a facially neutral law.28 The Court's general
person's religious practice. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221
(1972) (applying the compelling interest test to a request by the Amish to be
exempt from a state compulsory education law that significantly interfered
with Amish religious beliefs).
24. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) ("Only beliefs
rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its
terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion."); see also Esbeck,
supra note 4, at 598 ("Government cannot place an individual in the position
of having to prove the truth of his or her religious beliefs, but sincerity is re-
quired when invoking [free exercise of religion] protection.").
25. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (finding the
initial step in Free Exercise Clause analysis is to determine whether the gov-
ernment action places a substantial burden on a religious belief or practice);
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985)
(explaining that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt a religious entity
from governmental legislation unless the legislation actually burdens the en-
tity's free exercise rights).
26. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (noting
that the Supreme Court has sometimes found "certain governmental interests
so compelling as to allow even regulations prohibiting religiously-based con-
duct"); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 ("The mere fact that the petitioner's religious
practice is burdened by a governmental program does not mean that an ex-
emption accommodating his practice must be granted. The state may justify
an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means
of achieving some compelling state interest.").
27. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("[N]o showing
merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suf-
fice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, 'only the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'")
(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
28. Only five Supreme Court decisions have upheld a claimant's request
for a free exercise exemption from a facially neutral law: the Yoder case, in
which the Court exempted Amish parents from complying with a state law
requiring children under the age of sixteen to attend school, and four cases in
which the Court exempted a claimant from an unemployment compensation
requirement. David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise
Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241, 248 (1995). The Court
more often has denied an individual's free exercise exemption claim. Id. at
248-49. Not surprisingly then, the Supreme Court almost always finds that
the government satisfies its burden to demonstrate the existence of a compel-
ling governmental interest. See Shea Sisk Wellford, Tort Actions Against
Churches-What Protections Does the First Amendment Provide?, 25 U. MEM.
[Vol. 81:263
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uneasiness with religious-based exemptions from facially neu-
tral laws came to a head in 1990, when it ruled in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,29 that the
First Amendment does not release an individual from comply-
ing with an otherwise valid, religiously neutral law of general
applicability.3" In a response to the Smith decision,31 Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)2 three
years later "to restore the compelling interest test" and "to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of re-
ligion is substantially burdened."33
2. The Establishment Clause and the Lemon Test
The Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional pro-
scription on state establishment of religion to prohibit the gov-
ernment from supporting religion, endorsing all religion or pre-
ferring one religion over another, instituting a state religion, or
L. REv. 193, 203 (1994) (observing that in the majority of cases the Supreme
Court found the proffered governmental interest sufficiently compelling to
deny the religious-based exemption).
29. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
872 (1990).
30. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 n.3, 263
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
31. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)
(1994).
32. Id. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4.
33. Id. § 2000bb(b). RFRA mandates that the government may not
"substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" unless it "is in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive
means of furthering" that interest. Id. § 2000bb-1.
The exact impact of RFRA on free exercise analysis is uncertain. A num-
ber of scholars question the constitutionality of RFRA. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu,
Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 213 (1995) (raising constitutional questions
about Congress's power to force state governments to comply with RFRA).
Moreover, scholars have posited that RFRA is open to several different
statutory constructions, arguably allowing courts to apply the compelling in-
terest test in either a stringent or a lax manner. See id. at 193-98 (discussing
the various interpretations of RFRA and their effects on a free exercise chal-
lenge to an application of a governmental regulation). RFRA expressly states
that the purpose of the Act is to reinstate the "compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added). At the same
time, however, Congress notes in its findings that "the compelling interest
test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests." Id. § 2000bb(a)(5) (emphasis added). The ambiguity lies in the fact
that while "Sherbert and Yoder were stringent in their application of the com-
pelling interest test,.. later cases found the test easily met." Wellford, su-
pra note 28, at 210.
269
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actively participating in the affairs of religious organizations.34
Since the early 1970s, the Court has employed a three-part test
devised in Lemon v. Kurtzman35 to determine whether a gov-
ernmental -action resulting in substantial contact between re-
ligion and government violates the Establishment Clause.3"
The Lemon test requires that a valid regulation affecting relig-
ion has a secular purpose, 3 its primary effect neither advance
nor inhibit religion, 38 and that it not foster excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.39 The entanglement prong is
ultimately concerned with the degree of contact between the
state and religion as a consequence of the state action.40
Commentators and judges speculate that the Supreme
Court has abandoned the Lemon test sub silentioQ after em-
34. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("[T]he three main
evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protec-
tion: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sover-
eign in religious activity.'") (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)).
35. Id.
36. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1162 n.1 (4th ed. 1991) (noting that the Supreme Court has used the three-
part Lemon test "in most of the majority opinions of the Supreme Court that
examined establishment clause issues" since the test's introduction).
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 613. The entanglement prong includes an analysis of the char-
acter and purpose of the institution benefited, the nature of the governmental
aid, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority. Id. at 615.
40. While the entanglement prong is perhaps the most critical element of
the Lemon test, scholars have criticized it as lacking concreteness. See, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 18, at 1392 ("Entanglement' is such a 'blurred, indistinct,
and variable' term that it is useless as an analytical tool. Sometimes it seems
to mean contact, or the opposite of separation; it has also been used inter-
changeably with 'involvement' and relationship.' Sometimes it seems to mean
anything that might violate the religion clauses.") (citations omitted).
41. See Board ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481, 2500 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) ("As the Coures opinion today shows, the slide away from Lemon's
unitary approach is well under way. A return to Lemon, even if possible,
would likely be futile, regardless of where one stands on the substantive Es-
tablishment Clause questions."); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 583 ("The Supreme
Court continues distancing itself from Establishment Clause doctrine first
stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, by not referring to--or noting only in passing-
the three-part test."); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 256-76 (1993) (arguing that the latest Supreme
Court Establishment Clause cases indicate a shift away from Lemon).
Commentators identify two possible doctrinal replacements for the
Lemon test that appear in Supreme Court decisions but have yet to be em-
braced by a majority of the Justices: the endorsement test and the coercion
[Vol. 81:263
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ploying the test for nearly twenty years. Rather than applying
the Lemon test, the Court has recently approached Establish-
ment Clause cases by examining whether the government ex-
ercised its authority in a religiously neutral, manner.42 The
neutrality principle ultimately ensures that government does
not favor one religion over another or all religions over non-
religion.43 Thus, the Court requires that government employ
"neutral criteria and evenhanded policies" as to an individual
or group's religious beliefs when imposing benefits or bur-
dens.4
3. Judicial Deference to Intrachurch Disputes and the
Neutral Principles of Law Exception
The Supreme Court applies the "deference rule" whenever
a case requires a civil court to assume jurisdiction over a dis-
pute arising within a religious organization.45 The rule forbids
test. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTs IN THE MODERN STATE 115, 147-65 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al.
eds., 1992) (discussing the doctrinal tenets of both the endorsement and coer-
cion tests); Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurispru-
dence: The Souring of Lemon and the Search for a New Test, 27 PAC. L.J. 121,
135-40 (1996) (providing an overview of the endorsement and coercion tests).
The endorsement test embodies the neutrality principle by forbidding
government from favoring religion over non-religion, or one religion over an-
other. Engstrom, supra, at 135. The central criterion of the test is whether
the governmental action sends the message to observers that the government
"endorses" a particular religion or religion in general. Id. at 136-37; McCon-
nell, supra, at 147-48. The coercion test forbids governmental action that has
the effect of placing pressure on individuals to support or participate in relig-
ion or its exercise. Engstrom, supra, at 140.
As this Note goes to publication, the Justices are still grappling with Es-
tablishment Clause cases and searching for an analytical framework to re-
place Lemon.
42. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S.
Ct. 2510, 2521 (1995) (stating that a "significant factor in upholding govern-
mental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutral-
ity towards religion"); Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (ruling that a state statute
creating a special school district for a village comprised solely of a religious
enclave violates the Establishment Clause test of neutrality).
43. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2491 (observing that "a principle at the heart of
the Establishment Clause" is that "government should not prefer one religion
to another, or religion to irreligion").
44. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
45. The Supreme Court announced the rule in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 679 (1871), its first case addressing the power of secular courts to
resolve a religious institution's internal disputes that affected civil interests.
Id. at 727. Because Watson arose before the Court applied the religion
clauses to the states, the Court decided the case following federal common
law. See Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 n.5
(1976) (noting that the Watson Court based its decision on general federal
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civil courts from resolving ecclesiastical disputes over disci-
pline, faith, church governance, or doctrine.46  Furthermore,
the rule prohibits courts from adjudicating civil claims that
would require extensive inquiries into, or turn upon core ec-
clesiastical subjects.47 When such litigation comes before a
law). In dicta, subsequent Courts have accorded the deference rule constitu-
tional status. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969)
(characterizing Watson as having "a clear constitutional ring").
Despite such occasional dicta, however, the Supreme Court has failed to
integrate the deference rule with other religion clause analyses. See Grumet,
114 S. Ct. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring ) (characterizing Supreme Court
deference rule precedent as a distinct category of religion clause analysis). As
a result, many doctrinal questions in this area are without a definite answer.
For example, the Court has yet to decide whether a civil court can set aside
judicial deference towards a religious organization if a compelling governmen-
tal purpose exists. Additionally, the viability of the deference rule with the
current Supreme Court is uncertain. Chief Justice Rehnquist has maintained
that the rule as announced and applied in Watson v. Jones has "no constitu-
tional dimension." Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 728 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
46. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. Specifically, the Watson Court
identified as outside the purview of secular courts those matters which con-
cern "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or
the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals re-
quired of them." Id. at 733. The Court has hinted that the selection and as-
signment of clergy also should be considered a "purely ecclesiastical" matter.
See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1929)
(refusing jurisdiction over a beneficiary's claim to certain income under a will
where the claim turned on whether the beneficiary would be appointed to a
chaplaincy). Interestingly, few courts dismissing employment claims of clergy
refer to the Gonzalez decision, despite its strong support for the proposition
that secular courts cannot disturb the employment decisions of a religious or-
ganization regarding its clergy.
In a later decision, however, the Court indicated that the Free Exercise
Clause protects the freedom to select clergy. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Ca-
thedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). The Kedroff Court most likely was integrat-
ing the Watson and Gonzalez decisions with religion clause jurisprudence af-
ter the clauses were held applicable to the states. Yet, placing the right to
select clergy under the Free Exercise Clause raises the question of whether
the deference rule or the compelling interest test should be used to decide
whether adjudicating the claim of a clergy member against a religious organi-
zation violates the First Amendment. The distinction is significant because
while the deference rule absolutely prohibits judicial intervention, the Free
Exercise Clause allows limited governmental intrusion where a compelling
state interest exists.
The Court has limited the viability of Gonzalez by characterizing the
fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness exceptions to the rule as dicta. See Serbian
Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 712. The Serbian Court expressly rejected the
arbitrariness exception, id. at 713, but left open the question of whether there
can be " inarginal civil court review' under the narrow rubrics of 'fraud' or
'collusion! when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes." Id.
47. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (stating that the First
Amendment bars secular courts from resolving civil disputes on the basis of
[Vol. 81:263272
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civil court, the deference rule requires the court to abide by the
final decision of the highest religious authority on such mat-
ters, regardless of whether the court believes the religious or-
ganization's decision is "arbitrary."8
The Supreme Court has justified the deference rule in part
on the principle that religious organizations maintain both the
right to create tribunals to decide religious controversies and
the right to govern their members.4 9 Adopting a contractual
rationale, the Court has stated that individuals who join relig-
ious organizations implicitly consent to be bound by the deci-
sions of such tribunals." The Court also believes civil courts,
unlike ecclesiastical authorities, do not possess the necessary
competence or expertise to decide religious controversies or in-
terpret canonical doctrine.5 1
religious doctrine and practice); Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709
(stating that the First Amendment precludes judicial resolution of civil dis-
putes that require extensive inquiry into religious law and polity); Hull Me-
morial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449 (recognizing that civil litigation
violates the First Amendment when it turns on courts deciding controversies
over religious doctrine).
48. Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713. In other words, a civil
court cannot review a religious tribunal's decision for compliance with the
church's own ecclesiastical constitutions, laws, and regulations, but must in-
stead accept that tribunals decision as binding on religious matters. The Ser-
bian Court reasoned that such an inquiry would require a civil court imper-
missibly to scrutinize church law and doctrine. Id. The Court rejected any
review of ecclesiastical action relying on "rational" or "objective criteria" be-
cause such decisions are "reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith."
Id. at 714 (footnote omitted).
49. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29. The Watson Court acknowl-
edged that the religious freedom of individuals to
organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression
and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals
for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the associa-
tion, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual mem-
bers, congregations, and officers within the general associations, is
unquestioned.
Id.
50. Id. at 729. The Court also expressed concern that submitting those
decisions to secular court review would render the implied consent meaning-
less, undermining the authority and autonomy of religious entities to govern
themselves. Id.
51. Id. The Court contended that most religious organizations have "a
body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of [their] own, to be found in their
written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of prece-
dents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of ec-
clesiastical law and religious faith," making ecclesiastical courts the most
learned tribunals for settling such disputes. Id. The Court was concerned
that the interpretation of religious doctrine by civil courts would lead to the
persecution of certain religious minorities or to the establishment of a particu-
lar religion. Id. at 727-28, 733-34.
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In its last decision involving the deference rule, the Court
created the neutral principles of law exception. 2  Under this
exception, civil courts have the authority to resolve disputes
that involve matters typically secular in nature and in which
the state has an "obvious and legitimate interest," such as
property rights.5 3  The Court maintained that courts do not
violate the First Amendment by adjudicating intrachurch
property disputes according to objective, well-established neu-
tral principles of law, thereby avoiding any consideration of
ecclesiastical doctrine in judicial resolution.54 In addition, the
Court suggested that the judiciary could even examine church
documents to resolve disputes as long as the court did so in
purely secular terms.55
B. FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND COMMON LAW
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: TWO EXCEPTIONS TO THE
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT RULE
The foundation of American employment law is the at-will
employment rule, which provides that either the employer or
employee may terminate the employment relationship for any
cause or for no cause at all, absent an express agreement to the
contrary. 6 Most jurisdictions presume that an employment
52. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602, 604.
53. Id. at 604. The Jones Court acknowledged that controversies would
require deference where church documents incorporated ecclesiastical con-
cepts or where adjudication would require doctrinal inquiries. The Court,
however, expressly rejected the contention that the First Amendment re-
quired "compulsory deference to religious authority" in internal disputes
"even where no issue of doctrinal controversy [was] involved." Id. at 604-05.
54. Id. at 602-03. The Court argued that one advantage of the neutral
principles approach is that "it is completely secular in operation, and yet
flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity."
Id. at 603. Originated to resolve property disputes, the "method relies exclu-
sively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law famil-
iar to lawyers and judges," thereby promising "to free civil courts completely
from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." Id.
The Court also lauded the flexibility of the neutral principles method "in or-
dering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties."
Id.
55. Id. Jones arguably conflicts with Serbian Orthodox Diocese, which
forbids courts from engaging in a "detailed review" of church canon or
"delv[ing] into . . . various church constitutional provisions" to resolve dis-
putes. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 718-21 (1976).
56. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884)
(producing the classic definition of the at-will rule that "all may dismiss their
employees at-will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even
for cause morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of legal wrong"), rev'd
on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
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relationship is at-will but allow an employee to rebut that pre-
sumption by demonstrating that the claim falls within one of
the recognized exceptions to the rule." Two of the most com-
mon exceptions are discrimination claims and claims alleging
the existence of an employment contract restricting the em-
ployer's right to discharge.58
1. Fundamentals of Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws in an
Employment Context
Arguably, the most far-reaching and important restriction
on an employer's ability to discharge an employee is the body of
federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,5
9
national origin,60 sex,61 religion,62 age63 and disability.' These
57. The common law presumption is that an employment relationship is
at-will. See HENRY H. PERRrTT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1.1, at 3-4 (3rd ed. 1992). The plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting this
presumption by proving that the dismissal either violates a common law doc-
trine or contravenes a state law. Id.
58. For a compete synopsis of the exceptions to the at-will doctrine, see
LEx K LARSON & PHiLLIP BOROWSKY, 1 & 2 UNJUST DIsMISsAL §§ 3, 4, 6, 8,
10 (1996).
59. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (1994) (declaring it unlawful for an employer to not hire, to discharge, or to
otherwise discriminate against a current or prospective employee with respect




62. Id. Title VII contains three exemptions for religious employers: the
religious corporation exemption, the religious schools exemption, and the
"bona fide occupational qualification" provision, all of which overlap to a de-
gree and which religious employers use as defenses against religious dis-
crimination claims. Id.
The religious corporation exemption excuses religious corporations, asso-
ciations, educational institutions, and societies from complying with Title VII
"'with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to per-
form work connected with' the organization's activities." Id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 200e-1). While this exemption originally only applied to employees
whose jobs were connected with an employer's "religious activities," Congress
in 1972 deleted the term "religious." Id. The 1972 amendment broadened the
scope of the exemption to include employees who performed purely secular
duties for the religious employer. Id. Above all, it is important to note that
the exemption only extends to discrimination on the basis of the employee's
religion, and not to sex, race, color, or national origin discrimination. Brant,
supra note 5, at 284.
The second exemption permits religious schools, colleges, universities,
and other educational institutions owned, aided, or operated by a religious
organization to "hire and employ" individuals of a particular religion. Id. at
285 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2)).
Finally, Title VII allows all employers, secular or religious, to "hire and
275
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federal anti-discrimination laws prohibit an employer from in-
tentionally discriminating against individuals who belong to
certain protected classes.6" In cases in which direct evidence of
intentional discrimination does not exist, a plaintiff must pres-
ent circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment.6 In these
cases, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the
factfinder that any nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the
employer for the adverse employment action is merely pre-
text.67 If the factfinder concludes that a discriminatory animus
employ" individuals based on their sex, race, color, national origin, or religion
if the employer can demonstrate that the characteristic is a "bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)).
Although the defense is popular in employment discrimination cases, courts
construe it narrowly. Id. at 286.
63. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634(1994) (declaring it unlawful for an employer to not hire, to discharge, or to
otherwise discriminate against a current or prospective employee with respect
to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, on the basis
of age).
64. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (1994) (declaring it
unlawful for an employer who receives federal funds to discriminate against a
current or prospective employee solely because the employee is handicapped);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)
(declaring it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a qualified in-
dividual with a disability in regard to job application procedures, hiring, ad-
vancement, discharge, compensation, job training, or other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment).
65. The Supreme Court recognizes two types of employment discrimina-
tion. One type is disparate treatment, which occurs when an employer inten-
tionally discriminates. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW §
3.6, at 96-98 (1994). The other type is disparate impact, occurring when the
employer adopts an employment policy or criterion that disproportionately
affects members of a protected class even though a discriminatory animus did
not motivate the action. See id. § 3.18, at 128-32.
66. Because direct evidence of intentional discrimination rarely exists,
the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), ruled that plaintiffs could establish a prima facie claim of employment
discrimination with circumstantial evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of inten-
tional discrimination is hard to come by."). See generally, ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 65, §§ 3.7 & 3.8, at 98-103 (detailing methods by which a plaintiff
can prove intentional employment discrimination with direct and circum-
stantial evidence).
67. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff first must establish a prima fa-
cie case of employment discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
If the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
non-discriminatory reason for the alleged discrimination. Id. Because the
burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times, the employer
need not persuade the court that its articulated reason actually motivated the
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motivated the employer's adverse action, the court may award
a variety of remedies, including back pay, reinstatement, rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs, and punitive damages.6 8
2. Overview of Express and Implied Employment Contract
Claims
Common law traditionally provided that an employer
could dismiss an employee before the expiration of a definite
term contract only for cause.69 Moreover, courts enforced ex-
press agreements providing protection against at-will dis-
charge as long as independent consideration existed.70 More
recently, courts have expanded the common law protection for
employees by recognizing an implied contract exception to the
at-will rule.7' Under this approach, courts imply a contract
from an employer's promise of job security unilaterally com-
municated to the employee through an informal source, such as
adverse employment action, but must only produce admissible evidence suffi-
dent to justify judgment in its favor. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55 (1981). If the employer proffers a legitimate
reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's rea-
son is a pretext for discrimination Id. at 255-56.
68. See PAUL N. Cox, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 23, 23.02-.06(2d ed. 1992) (detailing the remedies for Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
69. See LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 58, § 3.01, at 3-1 to 3-2(observing that, historically, the employment at-will rule never applied to ex-
press contracts for a fixed term of employment); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note
65, § 9.2, at 524-25 (noting that an individual employed under a definite term
contract may not be fired except for cause).
70. Courts historically refused to enforce an employer's express promise
of job security unless the employee had provided consideration beyond contin-
ued service. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 58, § 3.03, at 3-11. The ra-
tionale is that an employee's promise to provide continual service in return forjob security lacks consideration because the employee already is obligated to
render that service for a paycheck Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks
and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 336 (1991-1992).
While most jurisdictions still adhere to this traditional view, a growing num-
ber of courts have liberalized the consideration requirement. These courts
employ two theories: unilateral contract and promissory estoppel. See
PERUITr, supra note 57, § 4.5, at 268-69 (stating that courts currently recog-
nizing wrongful termination claims allow the consideration requirement to be
met by a promissory estoppel theory); Befort, supra, at 340-45 (stating that
courts use unilateral contract and promissory estoppel theories as alterna-
tives to the consideration requirement).
7L See 9A INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS MAN., BNA 505: 51-52 (1996)
(noting that 34 states recognize an implied contract exception); PERRITT, su-
pra note 57, § 4.9, at 276-78 (describing how courts have fashioned common
law implied contract exceptions to the at-will rule).
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an employee handbook. v2
Where an employer discharges an employee in contraven-
tion of an express or implied contract, the court must deter-
mine whether the employer's action constitutes a breach .7  At
times this simply requires the factfinder to determine whether
the employer satisfied the contractual obligation, such as when
an employer promises to adhere to a progressive discipline
policy.74 Not infrequently, however, as in the case of just cause
provisions, the factfinder must also consider the policy ramifi-
cations of declaring the employer's actions a breach.75  If the
factfinder ultimately concludes improper dismissal occurred,
the employee is entitled to traditional contract damages meas-
ured by the employee's financial loss caused by the breach, less
any costs avoided by not having to work.76
C. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
INVOLVING RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Beginning in 1972, the federal appellate courts decided a
series of cases in which they exempted the employment rela-
tionship between clergy and religious organizations from fed-
eral anti-discrimination laws. 7 Although the courts varied
72. See Befort, supra note 70, at 333 (stating that courts have implied a
contractual obligation from a variety of informal sources, including oral repre-
sentations, pre-employment letters, employee handbooks, and a combination
of circumstances, including past company policy and the employee's length of
service).
73. See PERRITT, supra note 57, § 4.46, at 369-70 (describing what consti-
tutes a breach of an express or implied employment contract).
74. For example, if the contract obliges the employer to follow discipline
or discharge procedures, the factfinder only has to decide whether the em-
ployer followed the procedures. PERRITT, supra note 57, § 4.46, at 370. Ln
this situation, it is irrelevant whether just cause for the dismissal existed. Id.
75. When a breach of contract claim arises out of a just cause provision in
either an expressed or implied employment contract, two separate issues ex-
ist: whether the employee engaged in the alleged conduct, and whether such
conduct constitutes just cause for discharge. Id. § 4.49, at 375. Perritt sug-
gests that while the "first question is a straightforward fact dispute," the
"second question requires employer interests to be balanced against employee
interests, with appropriate consideration of the public interest on both sides."
Id.
76. Id. § 4.62, at 408-09; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 347 (1981) (stating that contract damages are ordinarily based on the in-
jured party's expectation interest and are intended to put him in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been performed). Ordi-
narily, reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy. PERREIT, supra note 57, §
4.63, at 418 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. b
(1979)).
77. See, e.g., Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist
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slightly in their reasoning, they ruled without exception that
adjudication of cleric discrimination claims would violate one
or both of the religion clauses. Some of the courts applied the
Free Exercise Clause's compelling interest test and concluded
that the state's interest in eliminating discrimination in the
workplace did not outweigh a religious organization's need for
the unfettered right to choose its spiritual leaders.78 Other
courts concluded that applying anti-discrimination law to em-
ployment decisions concerning clergy would offend the Estab-
lishment Clause, under the Lemon test, by causing an intoler-
able level of entanglement between the religious organization
and the state.79  Finally, most of the courts incorporated the
deference rule into their analyses by characterizing clergy
Church, 21 F.3d 184, 188 (7th Cir.) (affirming the dismissal of a sex and race
discrimination suit by a minister against a church), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
320 (1994); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360,
363 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding the dismissal of an age and sex discrimination
action by a priest against a church-affiliated hospital); Minker v. Baltimore
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1358 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of a minister's age discrimination suit
against his church); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Advent-
ists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding the dismissal of a sex
and race discrimination suit by a pastor against a church), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1020 (1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir.)
(affirming dismissal of a sex discrimination suit by a minister against a relig-
ious organization), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
78. See, e.g., Young, 21 F.3d at 185 ("[In a direct clash of 'highest order'
interests, the interest in protecting the free exercise of religion embodied in
the First Amendment to the Constitution prevails over the interest in ending
discrimination embodied in Title VII."); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69 (holding
that the free exercise of religion outweighs the governmental interest in
eradicating employment discrimination where finding discrimination would
introduce government standards to the selection of spiritual leaders).
79. See, e.g., Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362-63 (holding that the application of
Title VII and the ADEA to the employment relationship between a religious
institution and a cleric would result in excessive governmental entanglement
with religion); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169-71 (concluding that subjecting
church employment decisions to scrutiny under anti-discrimination law would
produce excessive governmental entanglement with religion).
The Rayburn court contended that applying both Title VII and the ADEA
to the employment relationship between a church and a cleric would cause
substantive and procedural entanglement. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170-71.
The court believed that state entanglement with religion was a risk because of
the importance of spirituality in the selection process of clergy. Id. The court
also contended that a religious organization's goals in the selection of its
clergy may differ from the neutral statutory mandates of anti-discrimination
laws. Id. This is clear when doctrine directly clashes with secular prohibi-
tions, as is the case of Seventh-Day Adventists whose doctrine precludes the
ordination of women. Id. at 1171 n.9. Using language more typical of Free
Exercise Clause analysis, the Rayburn court posited that religious organiza-
tions should be free to pursue their own goals and views free from govern-
mental entanglement. Id. at 1171.
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employment disputes as fundamentally ecclesiastical in na-
ture, and therefore outside the realm of secular authority."
Although some courts have demonstrated a willingness to
adjudicate the discrimination claims of non-clergy plaintiffs,81
other courts are wary of adjudicating such lawsuits when a re-
ligious organization proffers a religious reason for its employ-
ment decision.82 While some courts have dismissed the plain-
tiffs case under those circumstances, both the Second and
Third Circuits recently ruled that secular courts may inquire
into whether the religious belief is sincerely held or is mere
pretext masking a non-religious reason for the discharge.8 3
80. See, e.g., Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363 ("Personnel decisions by church-
affiliated institutions affecting clergy are per se religious matters and cannot
be reviewed by civil courts."); McClure, 460 F.2d at 559-60 (holding that the
deference rule prohibits judicial review of a religious organization's employ-
ment decisions and clergy practices because such matters are of "singular ec-
clesiastical concern").
81. See, e.g., Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038,
1045 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding secular adjudication of a temple administrator's
age discrimination claim did not violate First Amendment); Geary v. Visita-
tion of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331-32 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(ruling application of age anti-discrimination law to lay teachers at church-
operated school did not violate the First Amendment); DeMarco v. Holy Cross
High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171-72 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding application of age anti-
discrimination law to lay teacher who performed limited religious duties at
parochial school posed no First Amendment risks).
82. See, e.g., Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 401 (Minn. Ct. App.)
(affirming dismissal of non-clergy employee's claims because the religious or-
ganization provided a religious-based reason for discharge), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 75 (1995)). Because religion clause jurisprudence prohibits secular
courts from deciding the veracity of religious belief, such courts perceive an
organization's religious-based decision as a constitutional barrier to secular
adjudication. See id. ("The parties were unable and we cannot devise a way
to determine if [the religious organization's] reason for termination was a pre-
text for discrimination without questioning the reasons for the excommunica-
tion and the veracity of those reasons.").
83. See Geary, 7 F.3d at 330 ("A conclusion that the religious reason did
not in fact motivate dismissal would not implicate entanglement since that
conclusion implies nothing about the validity of the religious doctrine or prac-
tice and, further, implies very little even about the good faith with which the
doctrine was advanced to explain the dismissal."); DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170-71
(ruling a factfinder may make a pretext inquiry into a religious reason for a
challenged employment action without offending the First Amendment).
The DeMarco court believed courts can avoid First Amendment pitfalls by
focusing "upon factual questions such as whether the asserted reason for the
challenged action comports with the defendant's policies and rules, whether
the rule applied to the plaintiff has been applied uniformly, and whether the
putative non-discriminatory purpose was stated only after the allegation of
discrimination." DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 171. The court concluded that "in those
cases where a defendant proffers a religious purpose for its allegedly dis-
criminatory employment action, a plaintiff will usually be able to challenge as
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In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
circuit broke with the tradition of nonadjudication in Minker v.
Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church.84 In
Minker, a minister sued his church for age discrimination and
breach of written and oral contract.85 While the court affirmed
the dismissal of the age discrimination claim and the written
contract claim,86 it remanded the minister's breach of oral con-
pretextual the employer's justification without calling into question the value
or truthfulness of religious doctrine." Id. As the Geary court explained later:
The secular tribunal merely asks whether a sincerely held religious
belief actually motivated the institution's actions. The institution, at
most, is called upon to explain the application of its own doctrines.
Such an explanation is no more onerous than is the initial burden of
any institution in any First Amendment litigation to advance and
explain a sincerely held religious belief as the basis of a defense or
claim.
Geary, 7 F.3d at 330.
84. Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,
894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
85. Minker based his federal and state age discrimination claims on the
allegations that he had been denied a promotion solely on the basis of his age
and that younger individuals were offered new appointments when he was
passed up. Id. Minker's complaint also alleged that the Annual Conference
breached two contracts they had with him. Id. Minker based his breach of
contract claim on the promise by the United Methodist Church "to provide
[him] with a congregation more suited to his training and skills in exchange
for his continued work at the Mount Ranier Church." Id. at 1359. Minker
also argued that section 529.1 of the Book of Discipline, "the book of law of the
United Methodist Church," which declares that "appointments are to be made
without regard to race, ethnic origin, sex, color, or age, except for the provi-
sions of mandatory retirement," created a contract not to discriminate against
him on account of his age, independent of his age discrimination claims. Id. at
1355-56. Minker appealed after the lower court dismissed both of his claims.
Id. at 1356. He argued the First Amendment did not bar his statutory claims
because "the Church has no religious policy permitting age discrimination,
and no religious belief can be implicated by the fact alleged." Id. He also con-
tended that a breach of employment contract claim "does not implicate first
amendment principles." Id.
86. The Minker court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the age dis-
crimination claim on the ground that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits gov-
ernmental interference with the appointment of clergy because it is a purely
religious matter. Id. at 1356-57. The court noted that both the First Circuit
in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), and the Fourth
Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985), reached the same conclusion. Minker, 894 F.2d. at 1356-
57.
Minker also affirmed the dismissal of the written contract claim because
it required the court to interpret provisions in a religious document that were
"highly subjective, spiritual, and ecclesiastical in nature." Id. at 1359. The
court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf stated that
courts could interpret religious documents "as long as the analysis can be
done in purely secular terms." Id. at 1358. The Minker court added, however,
that the Jones Court "cautioned that not all provisions [of a religious docu-
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tract claim.87 Acknowledging that employment claims involv-
ing a minister and a church "touch the core of the rights pro-
tected by the free exercise clause,"88 the court nonetheless
maintained that the First Amendment does not preclude all
employment contract claims made against a religious organi-
zation.89 The court held that secular adjudication is permissi-
ble if the plaintiff can prove an employment contract claim
without engaging in an inquiry into church doctrine or church
motives behind the employment decision, and can demonstrate
that a non-intrusive remedy exists.90
The Minker court's holding that some employment contract
ment] are susceptible to neutral interpretation" because the document may
"'incorporate[] religious concepts... [which] would require the civil courts to
resolve a religious controversy.'" Id. at 1359 (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 604 (1976). The Minker court concluded that interpretation of the anti-
discrimination passages of the Book of Discipline was not possible because it
required the court "to consider the religious purpose of the anti-discrimination
provision and to define its limits for the church." Id.
87. Id. at 1361.
88. Id. at 1360.
89. Id. The Minker court reasoned that "[a] church is always free to bur-
den its activities voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully
enforceable in civil court." Id. (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
714 (1871)). It further stated that "courts may always resolve contracts gov-
erning 'the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or pur-
chase goods.'" Id. (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 606). The court con-
cluded:
A church, like any other employer, is bound to perform its promissory
obligations in accord with contract law. Pastor Minker is entitled to
rely upon his employer's representations and to enforce them in a
secular court. It is possible that the first amendment's prohibition
against proceedings that would create excessive entanglements with
religious beliefs will make appellant's task more difficult. But these
difficulties do not eliminate [Minker's] right to enforce his employ-
ment contract.
Id. at 1361.
90. Id. at 1360. The Minker court suggests both a possible, neutral
method of inquiry for proving the breach of contract claim and a permissible
remedy:
As a theoretical matter, the issue of breach of contract can be ad-
duced by a fairly direct inquiry into whether [Minker's] superinten-
dent promised him a more suitable congregation, whether [Minker]
gave consideration in exchange for that promise, and whether such
congregations became available but were not offered to Pastor
Minker. Similarly, Minker's injury can be remedied without court
oversight. Money damages alone would suffice since Minker already
has a new pastorship. Maintaining a suit, by itself, will not neces-
sarily create an excessive entanglement. Furthermore, as the rem-
edy would be limited to the award of money damages, we see no po-
tential for distortion of church appointment decisions from requiring
that the Church not make empty, misleading promises to its clergy.
Id. at 1360-61.
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claims are potentially judicable represented a departure from
the general judicial trend dismissing employment claims
brought by clergy against their religious employers. Few
courts have followed the trail of the Minker court. Instead,
most have dismissed a cleric's breach of employment contract
claim against a religious organization simply because the em-
ployee is a cleric.9 These courts believe employment decisions
regarding clergy are of prime ecclesiastical significance, rising
to the same level as decisions regarding doctrine; therefore,
any grievance arising from those decisions should be left to the
religious organization to resolve.92
9L See, e.g., Lewis v. Seventh-Day Adventists Lake Region Conference,
978 F.2d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of minister's breach
of contract and promissory estoppel claim against religious organization); Na-
tal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989)
(affirming dismissal of cleric's wrongful termination claim against non-profit
religious corporation); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986)
(affirming dismissal of minister's breach of employment contract claim
against church); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169,
1182 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (affirming church's motion for summary judgment
against minister's breach of contract claim); Knuth v. Lutheran Church Mo.
Synod, 643 F. Supp. 444, 449 (D. Kan. 1986) (mem.) (dismissing minister's
employment contract claims against church and church officials); Gabriel v.
Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (affirming dismissal of teacher's breach of contract claim against pa-
rochial school on grounds teacher is equivalent to cleric); Marshall v. Munro,
845 P.2d 424, 429 (Alaska 1993) (affirming dismissal of minister's breach of
employment contract claim against a Presbyterian Church executive officer);
Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 720-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming
dismissal of associate pastor's breach of contract claim against supervising
pastor and church); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1176 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (affirming dismissal of priests wrongful termination and breach of
implied covenant claims against bishop and church); United Methodist
Church, Baltimore Annual Conference v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 796-97 (D.C.
1990) (dismissing minister's breach of contract claim against church).
92. See, e.g., Lewis, 978 F.2d at 942 (concluding First Amendment prohib-
its civil courts from reviewing claims related to the employment of clergy);
Natal, 878 F.2d at 1578 (holding that inquiry into whether church discharged
pastor according to internal governance procedures would violate the Free
Exercise Clause); Hutchison, 789 F.2d at 396 (affirming dismissal of a Meth-
odist minister's challenge to forced enforcement because the claim "concerns
internal church discipline, faith, and organization, all of which are governed
by ecclesiastical rule, custom and law"); Sanders, 898 F. Supp. at 1182
(concluding First Amendment principles require dismissal of minister's
breach of contract claim because the claim relates to his employment as a
minister); Knuth, 643 F. Supp. at 449 (characterizing employment-based
claims between clergy and the church as "surrounded by an imposing and, in
most cases, insurmountable barrier" to civil adjudication); Black, 471 N.W.2d
at 720 (holding that associate pastor's discharge-related claims are
"fundamentally connected to issues of church doctrine and governance" which
are beyond judicial review); Higgins, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1174-75 (maintaining
that First Amendment principles preclude secular courts from "righting the
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT COMPEL
DISMISSAL OF A CLERIC'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
CLAIM SOLELY BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF IS A CLERIC
A religious organization's ability to choose clergy freely is
paramount to its autonomy.93 Courts are therefore arguably
justified in their reluctance to impose governmental regula-
tions, such as anti-discrimination legislation, that restrict a
religious organization's ability to choose who preaches from its
pulpit.94 Judicial refusal to adjudicate an employment contract
simply because the plaintiff is a cleric, however, has less
merit.95 Unlike anti-discrimination legislation, which imposes
society's moral and political values upon a religious organiza-
tion,96 judicial enforcement of contracts results from a volun-
tary decision by the organization to burden itself through con-
tract.
wrongs related to the hiring, firing, discipline or administration of clergy");
White, 571 A.2d at 794 ("Any attempt by the civil courts to limit the church's
choice of its religious representatives would constitute an impermissible bur-
den on the church's First Amendment rights.").
93. See Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The right to choose ministers without
government restriction underlies the well-being of religious community, for
perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects
to preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrine both to its
own membership and to the world at large.") (citation omitted); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972) ("he relationship be-
tween an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is
the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.").
94. This Note passes no judgment on whether the circuit court discrimi-
nation cases were correctly or incorrectly decided, but only seeks to distin-
guish contract claims from discrimination claims. For a criticism of the cir-
cuit court decisions, see Elizabeth S. Wendorff, Employment Discrimination
and Clergywomen: Where the Law Has Feared to Tread, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 152-56 (1993).
95. Even the circuit courts that have dismissed clerics' discrimination
claims recognize the difference between discrimination and employment con-
tract claims. See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("A church, like any
other employer, is bound to perform its promissory obligations in accord with
contract law. [A plaintiff] is entitled to rely upon his employer's representa-
tions and to enforce them in a secular court."); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 ("Of
course churches are not-and should not be-above the law. Like any other
person or organization, they may be held liable for their torts and upon their
valid contracts.").
96. See Brant, supra note 5, at 277 ("Employment discrimination laws
reflect society's understanding of legitimate and illegitimate bases of power
and status in the workplace.").
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A. THE DEFERENCE RULE DOES NOT COMPEL DISMISSAL
The strongest barrier to adjudication of a cleric's contract
claim is the deference rule.97 The rule's purpose is to ensure
that a secular court does not decide a question that is purely
ecclesiastical in character.98 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
has not clearly defined what matters are "purely ecclesiasti-
cal." Although the Court has designated doctrine, church gov-
ernment, faith, and religious law as core ecclesiastical mat-
ters,99 it has failed to elaborate on why these subjects, and not
other spheres of religious activity, deserve deferential treat-
ment. Furthermore, the Court has been unclear as to whether
judicial deference extends to a religious organization's assess-
ment of a potential cleric's qualifications.1 00
Even assuming that a deference rule protects a religious
organization's personnel decisions regarding clergy, secular
adjudication of contract cases does not violate the rule. First,
unlike anti-discrimination legislation that limits the factors a
religious organization may consider in deciding whether to hire
an individual as a cleric, 10 1 contract law generally applies only
after a religious organization hires an individual and then pro-
ceeds voluntarily to enter into a contract. 0 2 Consequently,
adjudication of breach of contract claims does not substantially
abridge a religious organization's freedom to select clergy.
This is also true for a religious organization's ability to dis-
charge or replace a cleric, because reinstatement is not ordi-
narily a remedy when the employer has breached the employ-
ment contract.103
More importantly, the rationale behind the deference rule
does not apply to a cleric's contract dispute. The underlying
97. See Wellford, supra note 28, at 196 ("Ecclesiastical abstention is the
strongest protection afforded to churches under the First Amendment.").
98. See supra, note 45 (discussing the deference rule).
99. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing those matters
the Supreme Court has identified as "purely ecclesiastical" under the defer-
ence rule).
100. See supra note 46 (discussing the Supreme Courts ambiguity regard-
ing whether employment matters concerning clergy should be protected under
the deference rule).
101. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing the limita-
tions that federal anti-discrimination legislation impose on employers).
102. See Gabriel v. Imxmanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640
N.E.2d 681, 684 (IlM. App. Ct. 1994) ("Enforcing vested secular, contractual
rights is clearly different from reviewing the subjective, ecclesiastical, per-
sonnel-appointment process of the church.").
103. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (detailing the remedies
available for a breach of contract claim).
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justification for the rule is that individuals who voluntarily
join religious organizations give their implied consent to be
bound by the decisions of that organization."° When a relig-
ious organization and a cleric enter into a civil contract, both
parties should implicitly understand that secular laws protect
those contractual rights.'05 Thus, the notion of implied consent
does not apply where the parties implicitly or explicitly agree
that a particular matter will be governed by civil authorities
and secular law." 6 The more secular the contract, the greater
the understanding of both parties that secular laws protect the
agreement. 07 In contrast, implied consent to secular enforce-
104. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (describing the Watson
Court's rationale for the deference rule).
105. The act of entering a civil contract should be viewed as a "non-
ecclesiastical activity." As one commentator notes, "The rule has long existed
that religious organizations, like everyone else, can be sued if they participate
in secular or 'non-ecclesiastical' activities." Garry, supra note 5, at 179. For
instance, "if religious organizations enter into a contract to purchase land,
they are as liable on that contract as any other individual or organization in
society." Id. The Supreme Court said as much in Watson v. Jones, explaining
that "[r]eligious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other
voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights
of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the
actions of their members subject to its restraints." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1871) (emphasis added).
106. See Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf" Church
Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 1291, 1331 (1980) ("And whether a particular question is a matter of in-
ternal church affairs, which may not be intruded upon by a civil court, de-
pends entirely on whether the parties consented, either expressly or by impli-
cation, to have the issue resolved within the structure of church
government.").
107. To illustrate this principle, Laycock points out that a merchant who
sells goods to churches does not implicitly consent to having any dispute
• arising from the sale adjudicated by church courts or without due process pro-
tections. Laycock, supra note 18, at 1406. While Laycock generally favors
granting religious organizations deference and autonomy in their employment
practices, he nevertheless acknowledges that a religious organization and its
employees are free to bargain to have their agreements enforced in secular
court. Id.
Where the religious employer and employee agree to an express employ-
ment contract, there should be little question that both parties expect that
agreement to be enforced in a secular court. More questionable is the situa-
tion in which an alleged contract is implied from an employee handbook, given
the possibility that many religious organizations are unsophisticated in em-
ployment matters and may not realize that promises contained in their em-
ployee handbooks can give rise to enforceable contracts. See supra notes 71-
72 and accompanying text (describing the judicial trend of enforcing promises
in employment manuals as implied contracts). There are two compelling ar-
guments, however, for enforcing implied contracts based on employee hand-
books. Principally, religious organizations are becoming more sophisticated in
[Vol. 81:263286
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ment is not present where the document giving rise to an al-
leged contract is purely ecclesiastical in nature."° Hence,
courts need to weigh the religious and secular character of the
contract to determine the parties' implied intent as to which
authority, civil or ecclesiastical, governs its enforcement.
10 9
Finally, because of the harshness of the deference rule,
courts should limit its application to only those ecclesiastical
matters clearly identified by the Supreme Court. Unlike the
compelling interest test,110 the deference rule does not involve a
balancing of the state's interests against those of the religious
organization. Instead, the rule absolutely bars secular court
intervention, regardless of whether the state or the plaintiff
has an overriding interest in secular adjudication of the em-
ployment dispute. Because of the potential for abuse by relig-
ious organizations who may use the rule to shield themselves
from civil liability, courts should not extend the deference rule
to other areas without a clear directive from the Supreme
Court. '
employment law. See, e.g., Philip J. Murren, Employment Issues, 34 CATH.
LAW. 331, 340-41 (1991) (discussing judicial enforcement of contracts based on
oral or written promises, in a Note originally delivered at a meeting of the Di-
ocesan Attorneys Association). Additionally, many secular employers remain
in the dark about legal developments that impact their personnel practices,
raising the question of why religious employers should be treated differently
and whether such disparate treatment implicates the Establishment Clause's
prohibition on governmental favoritism towards religion.
Of course, if religious organizations do not want to incur contractual obli-
gations, they can simply decline to enter into employment contracts with their
clergy. If the religious organization does choose to agree to an express con-
tract or promise job security in an employee handbook, the religious organi-
zation is still free to place a waiver in the document that provides that the
employee's only recourse for breach is ecclesiastical court. This is consistent
with Jones v. Wolf, in which the Supreme Court noted that the neutral prin-
ciples doctrine still allows religious organizations to achieve their wishes re-
garding property distribution prior to disputes by modifying deeds, corporate
charters, or religious constitutions. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979).
108. See Laycock, supra note 18, at 1405 (arguing that secular courts
should not turn "plainly ecclesiastical sources and documents" into contracts
because such documents have "no clear indicia of a desire for secular adjudi-
cation"); see also Ellman, supra note 17, at 1419 (observing that few church
documents are "drafted with an eye towards creation of an easily enforceable
contract.").
109. See infra Part IIA (arguing that implied employment contracts
based on religious documents are not enforceable because religious organiza-
tions are not consenting to secular adjudication of the promises contained in
the documents).
110. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (noting that the com-
pelling interest test balances an individual's free exercise of religion against
the state's interest).
111. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions:
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While the deference rule does not bar a contract claim
simply because the plaintiff is a cleric, the rule does preclude
those claims that require courts to decide questions of doctrine,
church policy, faith, or discipline.1 2 This construction of the
deference rule is consistent with the neutral principles of law
exception approved by the Supreme Court.11 3 In fact, a number
of courts have employed the neutral methods of proof approach
to adjudicate clerics' contract claims, implicitly concluding that
the deference rule does not necessarily bar a contract claim
merely because the plaintiff is a cleric. 1 4
B. ENFORCING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS IMPOSES A
NEGLIGIBLE BURDEN ON FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Although courts faced with clergy contract claims often re-
fer to the Free Exercise Clause, not one has applied the com-
pelling interest test in either its pre-Smith or RFRA form. 1 5
Perhaps these courts believe that, since previous courts have
already concluded that eliminating employment discrimination
is not a compelling enough reason to override the religious or-
ganization's interest in selecting and dismissing clergy, the
state's colorable interest in enforcing contracts is hardly wor-
The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 401 (1987)
("[Alutonomy theories tend to shield undesirable behavior without producing
any guarantee of a commensurate return of constitutional value.").
112. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (summarizing the types of
claims that the deference rule excludes from judicial review).
113. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (describing the neutral
methods of proof doctrine).
114. See, e.g., Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc., v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 729-31
(N.J. 1991) (applying neutral principles of law doctrine to adjudicate employ-
ment contract dispute between rabbi and synagogue); Reardon v. Lemoyne,
454 A.2d 428, 432-33 (N.H. 1982) (concluding that the trial court should have
adjudicated a contract dispute between nun-teachers and bishop superinten-
dent of parochial school according to neutral principles doctrine).
115. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (describing the compel-
ling interest test). If RFRA is found unconstitutional, then secular adjudica-
tion of a cleric's contract claim clearly is permissible according to the free ex-
ercise analysis articulated in Smith. See supra note 33 (discussing specu-
lation by scholars that RFRA is unconstitutional); supra note 30 and accom-
panying text (describing the Smith Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause). Contract law is facially neutral. Therefore, under Smith, religious
organizations would not be entitled to a religious-based exemption from judi-
cial enforcement of a cleric's employment contract. See Black v. Snyder, 471
N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct.'App. 1991) (ruling under a Smith analysis that
adjudicating a minister's breach of contract claim did not violate the church's
free exercise rights because contract law is generally applicable and facially
neutral).
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thy of analysis.116 Yet, before courts even address whether a
compelling governmental interest exists, they must first de-
termine whether the burden on the religious entity's free exer-
cise rights is substantial. 117 Thus, courts need to address the
magnitude of the burden that secular adjudication of a cleric's
employment contract imposes on a religious organization's free
exercise rights.
The voluntary nature of contracts significantly attenuates
any perceived burden imposed by secular enforcement. Unlike
federal anti-discrimination legislation that requires mandatory
compliance from employers, 118 religious organizations are un-
der no obligation to enter into employment contracts with
clergy. 119 It is highly improbable that those religious organi-
116. It is noteworthy that as late as 1979, after deciding both Sherbert and
Yoder, the Supreme Court ruled in Jones that "[t]he State has an obvious and
legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in
providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be de-
termined conclusively." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (citing Pres-
byterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969)). Interestingly, the
Jones Court never addressed whether judicial resolution of property rights
was a compelling governmental interest. Judicial enforcement of contract
rights is arguably just as important. See Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc., 593 A.2d
at 729 ("[C]ourts have a power, and perhaps a duty as well, to enforce secular
contract rights, despite the fact that the contracting parties may base their
rights on religious affiliations.").
117. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the role of bur-
den in free exercise analysis). For a description of RFRA's codification of the
"substantial burden" requirement and its impact on free exercise analysis, see
Lupu, supra note 33, at 188-90. In summarizing the post-RFRA case law on
substantial burden, Lupu identifies three circumstances in which a burden
may be found: "a direct legal prohibition against conduct religiously required,
direct legal compulsion of conduct religiously forbidden, or the conditioning of
an important benefit upon infidelity to religious commitment." Id. at 202.
While federal and state anti-discrimination legislation may arguably impose a
burden under the second circumstance, secular adjudication of employment
contracts does not fit any of the three criteria.
118. Because federal anti-discrimination legislation requires mandatory
compliance from employers, those laws significantly burden a religious or-
ganization's ability to select clergy without interference. This is particularly
evident when the prohibitions of the anti-discrimination laws directly conflict
with religious belief. For example, those religious organizations that do not
allow women to serve as clerics would face the dilemma of violating either the
anti-discrimination legislation or their own religious tenets. See Wendorff,
supra note 94, at 138 (noting that the Roman Catholic Church, the Mormon
faith, and Orthodox branches of Judaism still exclude women from ordina-
tion).
119. An obvious exception is when employees form a union and force an
employer to enter into collective bargaining negotiations under the guidelines
of the National Labor Relations Act. Significantly, the Supreme Court ex-
empted teachers in church-owned schools from the jurisdiction of the Act in
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979).
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zations that choose to contract with their clergy do so because
of a doctrinal tenet or religious conviction. Instead, religious
organizations, like any other entity, enter contractual agree-
ments to obtain some benefit, such as to "lock up" the services
of an employee. 120  To excuse a religious organization from
complying with a commitment into which it has voluntarily en-
tered is unjust and illogical. 121
The different burdens that employment contracts and gov-
ernmental workplace regulations impose are particularly evi-
dent when viewed in the context of the at-will employment doc-
trine.122 The belief that religious organizations should have the
unfettered right to hire and fire clerics underlies the institu-
tional autonomy argument in favor of granting religious or-
ganizations exemptions from compliance with governmental
regulations. 123 In other words, courts maintain an unassailable
at-will relationship between clergy and their religious employ-
ers. Yet, the employment at-will rule never traditionally ap-
plied when the parties agreed to an employment contract. 124 In
fact, freedom of contract served as a primary philosophical and
legal justification for the at-will rule.125 When a religious or-
ganization voluntarily enters into an employment contract
with a cleric, the organization exercises its freedom to contract
away an at-will relationship. This voluntary waiver is funda-
mentally different than the governmental imposition of exter-
120. See Befort, supra note 70, at 337-38 (describing how employers bene-
fit from promises contained in general statements of personnel policy).
121. See Reardon v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428, 432 (N.H. 1982) ("[Ilt would
be unfair and illogical to deny access to the civil courts in non-doctrinal mat-
ters to parties who have voluntarily entered into civil contracts.") (citing Ell-
man, supra note 17, at 1402-03); see also Adams & Hanlon, supra note 106, at
1330 ("Indeed, refusal to adjudicate a dispute over... contractual obligations
simply because the litigants are religious [entities] 'smacks of a denial of
equal protection as well as a violation of first amendment rights.'" (quoting
Robert C. Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement,
62 MICH. L. REV. 419, 432 (1964)).
122. See supra notes 59-63 (noting protections extended by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967).
123. See Esbeck, supra note 4, at 600 n.72 (defining a religious organiza-
tion's "institutional autonomy" to include the organization's right to freely
hire and fire clergy).
124. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining that the at-will
employment rule has never been applied to an employment relationship gov-
erned by an express employment contract for a fixed term).
125. See Caroline R. Fredrickson, Freedom of Contract and the Remedy of
Forced Hiring: A Comparative Assessment of German and American Anti-
Discrimination Law, 4 J.L. & POLY 1, 5-12 (1995) (providing an overview of
the notion of freedom of contract in American law).
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nal limits on the religious organization's employment relation-
ship with its clerics. 2
6
C. ADJUDICATION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ANTI-
ENTANGLEMENT PRINCIPLE OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Courts that invoke the Lemon Establishment Clause test
to dismiss clergy employment claims believe adjudication
would result in excessive entanglement between government
and religion." 7 They reason that the relationship between
clergy and religious organizations is so highly ecclesiastical
that any governmental intrusion would result in an intolerable
level of contact between church and state. The Supreme Court,
however, has required a "permanent and pervasive" contact be-
tween religious organizations and the government in order to
find entanglement. 128 By its nature, secular adjudication of a
civil claim produces only a limited and singular contact,
thereby avoiding excessive entanglement.1 29 To conclude oth-
erwise would effectively insulate religious organizations from
any civil claim brought by members of clergy. Nevertheless,
courts have been reluctant to adopt such a far-reaching view of
the First Amendment's protections.
30
126. See Laycock, supra note 18, at 1403 (arguing state enforcement of a
voluntary agreement is different from coercive state regulation imposed upon
a religious organization).
127. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the entangle-
ment concerns expressed by courts that dismiss cleric employment suits
against religious organizations).
128. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985) (finding entanglement
where federal funds were used to pay the salaries of public school teachers
working in parochial schools).
129. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d
324, 328 (3rd Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between a single instance of judicial
intrusion into a religious organization's autonomy, such as adjudication of an
age discrimination suit, and a continuing and pervasive governmental intru-
sion such as allowing the NLRB to certify teachers at a Roman Catholic high
school); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 169-70 (2nd Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing between "ongoing supervision of all aspects of employment"
and a "limited inquiry" produced by a civil employment suit).
130. See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[T]he first amendment does
not immunize the church from all temporal claims made against it."); Reardon
v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428, 431 (N.H. 1982) ("Religious entities... are not to-
tally immune from responsibility under the civil law. In religious controver-
sies involving property or contractual rights outside the doctrinal realm, a
court may accept jurisdiction and render a decision without violating the first
amendment."); Bodewes v. Zuroweste, 303 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973)
("It was not the intent of [the First] [Almendment, and it has been so held in
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Further, the real entanglement risk lies where secular
adjudication of a contract claim requires a judicial inquiry into
core ecclesiastical matters. By adopting a neutral principles
approach, courts can resolve the secular questions a contract
claim raises and still avoid any religious controversies over
"questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice."131 As long
as adjudication of the contract claim does not require the court
to decide such questions, no risk of excessive entanglement
with religion exists. 132
If commentators are correct in asserting that the Supreme
Court has replaced the Lemon test with a neutrality-based
analysis, 133 secular courts undoubtedly can adjudicate contract
claims. As long as courts enforce employment contracts
against both religious and non-religious employers, the state
would be exercising its authority in a religiously neutral man-
ner. Moreover, a court would violate the neutrality test if it did
exempt religious organizations from compliance with their
employment contracts unless the Free Exercise Clause com-
pelled such an exemption.
III. PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS SHOULD
FOCUS ON THE NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT INSTEAD OF THE PLAINTIFF'S JOB IN THE
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION
Courts should not dismiss a cleric's employment contract
claim solely because of the job the plaintiff performs for the re-
many cases, that civil and property rights should be unenforceable in the civil
court simply because the parties involved might be the church and members,
officers, or the ministry of the church.").
131. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979); see also Geraci v. Eckankar,
526 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minm. Ct. App.) (maintaining that the religion clauses
do not prevent judicial review of an employee's workplace claims against a re-
ligious organization if the claims can be resolved through neutral methods of
proof), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995); Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d
233, 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("[W]hen a claim may be resolved by 'neutral
methods of proof unrelated to issues of church doctrine or governance, then.
the First Amendment will not prohibit judicial review.").
132. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989)("[R]outine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious
doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no 'detailed
monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and religious
bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.") (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text
(discussing how the neutral principles approach avoids entanglement).
133. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Su-
preme Court's apparent abandonment of the Lemon test in favor of a neutral-
ity-based approach).
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ligious organization. This tenet does not mean, however, that
courts must adjudicate all contract claims brought by clerics.
Instead, courts should examine the contract claim and any de-
fenses the religious organization offers to determine whether
any constitutional barriers exist. Specifically, courts should
dismiss contract claims based on promises contained in relig-
ious documents or claims that require a court to determine the
truth of an employer's religious reason for its adverse employ-
ment decision. In this regard, a cleric's employment contract
claim is no different from that of any other employee who
works for a religious organization.
A. SECULAR COURTS CANNOT IMPLY CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS FROM RELIGIOUS DOCUMENTS
Clerics who seek judicial enforcement of religious organi-
zations' employment promises and practices generally claim
the existence of an implied employment contract. They, like
most American workers, do not have an express contract with
their employers.' Typically, the cleric asks the court to imply
a contractual obligation from promises contained in a religious
document or canonical text.115 These promises usually include
procedural requirements governing the hiring, appointment,
discipline, and discharge of clerics. The cleric claims that the
employer breaches the alleged implied contract when it fails to
follow its own procedures. 136
Courts must dismiss these implied contract claims for a
variety of reasons. First, the deference rule prohibits courts
134. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the
Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 850 (noting that
experts estimate that of the approximately 90 million persons employed by
the private sector in nonagricultural jobs, approximately 60 million are at-will
employees).
135. See, e.g., Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (analyzing implied contract
claim based on promises made by church in religious text); United Methodist
Church, Baltimore Annual Conference v. White, 571 A.2d at 790, 791 (D.C.
1990) (arising from minister's breach of implied contract claim based on
promise made by religious organization in religious text).
136. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471
(8th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of minister's claim that the religious or-
ganization violated its own bylaws because such claims are not judicable by
secular courts); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1576
(1st Cir. 1989) (arising from cleric's contract claim that church failed to follow
its own employment procedures contained in religious constitution and eccle-
siastical canon); Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Ky.
1993) (arising from minister's employment contract claim that church failed to
follow procedures set forth in religious document).
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from forcing a religious organization to follow its own ecclesi-
astical laws and procedures, regardless of how arbitrary or
egregious an organization's behavior appears.11 7 The Supreme
Court has declared the notions of due process and fundamental
fairness embodied in secular law inapplicable to the question of
whether religious organizations observe their own tenets and
canons. 3 ' Second, for virtually all such promises, the relevant
provisions in the document incorporate subjective and religious
concepts in their promissory language. 13 9 Under all religion
clause theories, courts must leave the interpretation of doc-
trinal matters and the right to construe religious canon to ec-
clesiastical tribunals and religious bodies.14 Finally, the im-
plied consent principle underlying the deference rule bars
secular adjudication of contract claims based on religious
documents. Implicit in the promises made by religious organi-
zations in ecclesiastical documents is the understanding that
any dispute arising from such promises will be resolved within
the religious body."' A cleric is justified in relying on such
promises only to the extent that a remedy is available from the
religious organization itself.'
137. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing Serbian Ortho-
dox Diocese as establishing the constitutional principle that civil courts may
not overturn a religious organization's arbitrary decision on an ecclesiastical
matter).
138. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 715 (1976)
("Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of
'fundamental fairness' or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly rele-
vant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.").
139. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that the Minker
court dismissed a minister's implied contract claim because it required judi-
cial interpretation of subjective and ecclesiastical provisions in a religious
document); Williams v. Palmer, 532 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
("Whether or not the Conference followed required procedure in appointing
plaintiff is not for a civil court to consider, because it would entail scrutinizing
the appointment decision-making process and reviewing the subjective crite-
ria used by the church organization in reaching its decision.").
140. See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 106, at 1328 ("Although civil courts
have an expertise in the tasks of interpreting documents and discovering the
intentions of parties to contracts, that expertise presumably does not extend
to ecclesiastical matters."); see also White, 571 A.2d at 794 (arguing secular
courts cannot interpret religious documents without usurping the right of re-
ligious organizations to construe their own ecclesiastical texts).
141. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the Watson
Courts reasoning that individuals who join religious organizations give their
implied consent to be bound by ecclesiastical rules).
142. See Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1974)
(stating that the only remedy available to a pastor claiming congregation's
employment actions are arbitrary is an internal grievance process).
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While religious documents as a rule do not give rise to an
employment contract cognizable in a civil court, an instrument
secular in nature, such as an employee handbook, generally
should be enforceable under an implied contract theory.'
Obviously, some secular documents will contain religious con-
cepts, rendering them unenforceable. Yet, a court should not
allow the mere existence of a doctrinal seal on a contract or
document to deter it from enforcing an otherwise valid contrac-
tual obligation. Total judicial abstention would transform
secular courts "into handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness."'"
Hence, where the secular text can be subjected to an objective,
neutral reading, the court simply must "evaluate the pertinent
contractual provisions and extrinsic evidence in cases of ambi-
guity, to determine whether any violations of the contract have
occurred, and to order appropriate remedies, if necessary."45
B. SECULAR COURTS MAY ADJUDICATE JUST CAUSE
PROVISIONS WHILE DEFERRING RELIGIOUSLY-BASED
FACTFINDING TO APPROPRIATE TRIBUNALS
For both definite term employment contracts and some
implied contracts providing job security, an employer can raise
the defense that no breach occurred because a just cause for
the discharge existed. 46 If the religious organization provides
a non-religious explanation for its actions, then the contract
claim is completely judicable.147 Because the employer is a re-
143. See Hemphill v. Zion Hope Primitive Baptist Church, Inc., 447 So. 2d
976, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding wrongful termination claim based
on discharge procedures contained in corporate charter does not touch eccle-
siastical matters); Reardon v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428, 432-33 (N.H. 1982)
(concluding that secular courts may enforce the terms of a nondoctrinal em-
ployer handbook against a religious employer).
144. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 727 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. Reardon, 454 A.2d at 432; see also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136,
139 (Ct. App. N.Y.) (stating that courts can enforce secular provisions in
documents that contain provisions which are not judicially recognizable), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
146. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the role of just
cause in contract disputes).
147. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471-
72 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The First Amendment does not shield employment deci-
sions made by religious organizations from civil court review ... where the
employment decisions do not implicate religious beliefs, procedures, or law.");
Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Minn. Ct. App.) (ruling an em-
ployee's employment claims based on pay disparity were judicable because the
religious organization did not allege religious reasons for the disparity), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995).
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ligious organization, however, there is a strong likelihood that
the organization will proffer a religious reason for its adverse
employment decision.1 48  Such a circumstance presents a po-
tential constitutional barrier to further adjudication of the con-
tract claim because traditional Free Exercise Clause analysis
forbids courts from deciding the veracity of religious belief and
doctrine. 49
One possible solution is for courts to follow recent federal
caselaw ruling that the judiciary can inquire into whether an
organization's proffered religious-based motivation for an ad-
verse employment action is mere pretext. 150 Under this ap-
proach, courts decide whether the organization's proffered just
cause served as the actual motivation behind a cleric's dis-
charge. 51 While courts may determine whether the proffered
religious-based justification is pretext, they are prohibited
from determining the veracity of the religious justification. 15 2
Moreover, the First Amendment bars courts from making
judgments about whether the alleged religious reason for dis-
missal rises to a level significant enough to merit a just cause
for the breach, because such a determination would displace
the organization's constitutional right to define its own religion
and interpret its doctrine and canon.
A second possibility exists when the religious organization
has established its own tribunal to decide disputes of ecclesi-
astical character. If both parties consent, the court can refer to
the ecclesiastical tribunal the question of whether the organi-
zation's religious-based reason for discharging the cleric consti-
tutes just cause. 53 While submitting religious disputes to an
148. See Treaver Hodson, Comment, The Religious Employer Exemption
Under Title VII: Should a Church Define Its Own Activities?, 1994 BYU L.
REV. 571, 586 (1994) (observing that the "employment practices of religious
employers are often religiously based").
149. See supra note 24 (stating that free exercise jurisprudence prohibits
the state from questioning the truthfulness of a religious belief).
150. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing courts that have
allowed a limited pretextual inquiry).
151. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (summarizing the pretex-
tual approach in intentional employment discrimination cases).
152. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2nd Cir. 1993)
("Supreme Court precedents preclude the government from serving as the
arbiter of the truthfulness or validity of religious beliefs.").
153. See, e.g., Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 729-32
(N.J. 1991) (refusing to overturn trial court's decision to submit the religious
issues of a synagogue's contract claim against a rabbi to a rabbinical tribunal,
based on finding that synagogue consented to the tribunal's jurisdiction and
decision).
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ecclesiastical tribunal for resolution, the court reserves for civil
adjudication any contract issues remaining after the tribunal's
determination.154 This approach guarantees judicial deference
to the religious organization on underlying ecclesiastical is-
sues, while allowing a court to decide the civil aspects of the
cleric's contract claim.
CONCLUSION
Clergy perform vital and highly spiritual functions for
their religious employers. Consequently, courts should act
cautiously when resolving employment disputes involving a
clergy member and a religious organization to prevent unnec-
essary intrusion into the right of a religious organization to set
its own ecclesiastical course. Religious organizations, however,
are not above secular law and should be held accountable for
the contracts they voluntarily enter. Hence, courts face the
difficult challenge of deciding at what point a cleric's secular
right to enforce a valid employment contract must yield to an
organization's constitutionally protected right to religious
autonomy in ecclesiastical matters.
Unfortunately, courts generally abstain from engaging in
that delicate balancing act and, instead, have deferred blindly
to religious organizations' employment practices regarding
clergy. Because religion clause jurisprudence does not support
judicial deference when religious organizations voluntarily en-
ter into secular contracts, some courts wrongly dismiss clerics'
contract claims. As courts continue to expand the class of in-
dividuals filling cleric-like positions in religious organizations,
more individuals are being unjustly deprived of their contrac-
tual rights. Courts must begin to examine the nature of the
alleged contract and the constitutional issues stemming from
the contract itself. The shift in focus from the plaintiffs job
status to the gravamen of the claim will enable courts to pro-
tect both a religious organization's right to autonomy in core
ecclesiastical matters as well as a cleric's reliance on promises
made by the religious organization in secular contracts.
154. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly noted that the First
Amendment forbids secular courts from referring civil issues to a religious
tribunal. Id. at 732. To avoid impermissible entanglement of civil and relig-
ious issues and to preserve a record for the parties and a reviewing court, the
court emphasized the important responsibility of civil courts to identify pre-
cisely and carefully which issues are civil and which issues should be referred
to religious authority.

